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Abstract 
This paper provides empirical evidence supporting the view that constitutions may influence 
the organization of economic activities. Dealing with the issue of the institutional determinants 
of entrepreneurship, it shows that some of the provisions contained in national constitutions are 
positively and significantly associated to a standard measure of entrepreneurial dynamics, 
namely the rate of new business density. Using a novel dataset containing the characteristics of 
the constitutions enacted in the world and a sample of 115 countries, the paper finds that 
provisions about the right to conduct/establish a business, the right to strike, consumer 
protection, protection of trademarks, and education promote higher rates of new firm 
formation. 
Keywords: Constitutional Rules, Entrepreneurship, New Firm Formation, Economic Effects 
of Constitutions  
JEL Codes: D72, K10, H10, L26, M13, O50, P48  
 
 
 
 
 
 
*We thank, with the usual disclaimers, Hien Thu Tran for assistance in data collection, Luigi A. Franzoni for 
useful comments and suggestions.  
 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Historically some countries are characterized by a greater endowment of entrepreneurship 
capital that results in persistently high rates of new firm formation. This characteristic of a 
country might be linked to the widespread presence of individuals who come up with new ideas 
and put them into practice (Baumol, 2010), to the specialization in industries where the 
minimum efficient scale level of output is smaller (Acs and Audretsch, 1993), or to the 
availability of opportunities (Kirzner, 1973) and knowledge spillovers (Acs et al., 2009). But 
there is also the possibility that the pillars of the legal and institutional systems designed in a 
country’s constitution create a setting more or less favorable to the undertaking of 
entrepreneurial ventures. For example, the principles introduced by America’s Founders at the 
Constitutional Convention sessions in 1787 to protect property rights and free markets clearly 
contributed to promote the conditions for the entrepreneurial dynamism lately witnessed by de 
Tocqueville in On Democracy in America (Chapter XIX): “What astonishes me in the United 
States is not so much the marvelous grandeur of some undertakings as the innumerable 
multitude of small ones”.1 
This paper studies the effect of a number of institutional principles - ranging from provisions 
for a counter corruption commission to the enforcement of economic rights, from the adoption 
of economic plans to the protection of the environment, from the national integration of ethnic 
communities to education - stated in the constitutional texts of 115 countries on the rate of 
entrepreneurship over the 2004-2013 period (the list of countries is reported in Appendix 1). 
Some of these principles are among those most commonly associated to a higher propensity by 
individuals to start up a firm. Besides considering the characteristics of constitutions, we also 
take into account some additional country-specific factors, which are likely to influence firm 
demographics, our aim being to compare the impact, exerted on the rate of entrepreneurship by 
de jure (constitutions variables) and de facto (control variables) characteristics of the countries 
considered. Constitutions typically represent the highest, direct source of law. They regulate the 
relationship between government agencies and bodies and the citizenry. They also state the 
fundamentals rights a polity is willing to protect. The rules and the principles stated in a 
constitution are stable and the protection granted to rights strong. Requirements to amend a 
constitution are generally strict (supermajorities, special legal procedures), which reduces 
legislative discretion and makes change very onerous. That is why it is particularly interesting 
to study the impact of constitutional rules on the economic system. Knowing which principles 
foster development and growth can help countries to avoid mistakes that might be very costly. 
                                                            
1 Cf. Larson and Winship (2005). 
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Secondly, because of the particular strength of the rights included in a constitution, the impact 
on economic variables is likely to be remarkable and it is important to identify in a precise and 
complete manner. 
Main findings show that provisions dealing with the right to conduct/establish a business, 
the right to strike, consumer protection, protection of trademarks, and education promote higher 
rates of new firm formation, while provision about economic planning and protection of the 
environment constrain new firm formation. Problems of serial correlation and endogeneity are 
treated using a GMM model and adopting an instrumental variable estimation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the relevant literature, with special 
reference to the contributions dealing with the impact of constitutions on national economies. 
Section 3 presents main research hypotheses and theoretical explanations. Section 4 describes 
the dataset and the empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the main findings. Section 6 
concludes with some suggestions for possible revisions/design of new of constitutional texts. 
 
2. Literature Survey 
According to Melton et al. (2013), the design features of constitutions, from their level of 
specificity to the number of rights enumerated and the clarity of their text, do matter in shaping 
the patterns of institutional development exhibited by different countries at different times.  
In-depth analysis of the link between economic performance and constitutions dates back to 
the public choice literature analyzing the impact of different constitutional settings on the size 
of government, welfare expenditure and generally on the composition of public expenditure 
(see Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, and, for a general overview, 
Mueller, 2003 and Voigt, 1999).  
The work of the aforementioned scholars is however theoretical in nature. Until the early 
2000s, very little work had been done, discovering the causal links between the constitutional 
characteristics of a country and its economic performance. This gap in the literature was filled 
by Persson and Tabellini (2003). In their book, they analyze the impact that the form of 
government (defined as presidential system as opposed to a parliamentary system) and the 
electoral rule (majoritarian versus proportional) have on several economic variables dealing 
with fiscal policy, rent extraction by the government (perceived corruption and grafts) and 
economic productivity of the country (measured by labor and total factor productivity).  
Their results are interesting. Their main finding is that both presidential systems and 
majoritarian electoral rules result in much lower government expenditure than parliamentary 
and proportional systems. These results are strengthened further if government systems and 
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electoral rules are considered together. Namely, public expenditure is definitely lower for 
presidential majoritarian systems than for parliamentary proportional ones. 
Persson and Tabellini (2006) extend their previous analysis to account for the effect of 
constitutions on economic growth. They find democratization promotes growth, however there 
seems to be complementarity between the extension of political rights and economic 
liberalization. Moreover, they find that democratization into a presidential system has a bigger 
impact on growth than democratization into a parliamentary system.  
Blume et al. (2009a) have reproduced Persson and Tabellini’s study, extending it to a larger 
number of countries and using a novel dataset. These authors partially confirm Persson and 
Tabellini’s results. However, the impact of presidential systems on economic and fiscal 
indicators is definitely weaker, whereas electoral rules generally maintain their effect. 
Particularly, results concerning government efficiency are less clear-cut. 
Blume et al. (2009b) extend Persson and Tabellini’s analysis to direct democracies. They 
generally confirm previous results. Particularly, they show that direct democratic institutions 
influence fiscal policy and government efficiency, whereas the link with productivity is not 
statistically significant. Moreover, they find that the type of direct intervention matters 
(mandatory referendums seem to constrain spending, whereas public initiative increases it).  
Knutsen (2009) further investigates this line of analysis. He re-estimates the effect of 
constitutional variables on economic growth using a data set that, for some countries, dates 
back to 1820. He finds no significant, positive impact of presidentialism on economic growth, 
whereas proportional electoral rules have a strong positive influence. 
Parker (2007) provides a very interesting discussion of the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and the law. He argues that the law influences organizational forms in 
entrepreneurship. For instance, high legal costs might foster entrepreneurship in the form of 
self-employment. Legal constraints like non-distribution of surplus, often matched to tax breaks 
favor social enterprises. Regulations, labor law and also deregulation have also an important 
influence. Institutions and market structures play an important role also in Guiso et al. (2004). 
Using individual level data, these authors study the effect of differences in the ease with which 
external funds are obtained by households across Italian regions on entrepreneurship and 
economic growth. They find that financial development enhances the probability individuals 
become entrepreneurs, favors entry by new firms, and exerts a positive effect on the number of 
firms per inhabitant. 
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In this paper we deal with the impact of constitutions on entrepreneurship and, particularly, 
on the rate of new business formation.2 The closest previous study is Zhang (2012), who 
analyzes empirically the link between institutional characteristics of a country, rent seeking and 
entrepreneurship. The story he has in mind basically implies that institutional (and 
constitutional) features impact on rent-seeking (unproductive behavior). The higher the 
incentive to engage in rent-seeking, the lower the share of individuals entering productive 
entrepreneurship, and therefore the lower the number and the quality of entrepreneurs. His 
study, however, differs from ours in many respects. First of all, following Persson and Tabellini 
(2003) and later contributions, he focuses mainly on what he calls “the constitutional 
environment”, that is the form of government, electoral rules and the degree of federalism. 
Secondly, he does not perform a full-fledged analysis, encompassing all aspects at once, but he 
studies the impact of the various institutional aspects separately. So we have an OLS regression 
analyzing the impact of federalism, a different one analyzing forms of government, etc., which 
limits the relevance of his, results substantially. Finally, he uses a different definition of 
entrepreneurship from ours. Particularly, he defines entrepreneurship as the rate of self-
employed workers on the total employed population. Such measure is unable to capture the 
overall process of new firm formation and industry dynamics but simply measures the degree 
of (very) small firm presence. 
However, there is a growing literature on the effects of institutions on entrepreneurship that 
has identified a link between entrepreneurship and the development of the justice system, with 
the quality of the latter seen as a crucial determinant of the possibility to successfully start a 
new venture (cf., among others, Quentin, 2008; Visaria, 2009). 
Pioneering contributions include Johnson et al. (2000); Frye and Zhuravskaya (2000); 
Djankov et al. (2006). These are empirical studies and mainly deal with the incentives to hide 
economic activities and with the influence that institutional characteristics (especially 
efficiency and consequent faith in the judiciary, tax rates, bureaucratic corruption) exert on 
such incentives. Chemin (2009) deals with the impact of judicial efficiency specifically on 
entrepreneurship, defined as entry rates by new firms as obtained from the World Bank Group 
Entrepreneurship database. One of the main problems presented by the literature on the impact 
of the judiciary (and of institutions more generally) on economic activity is causality, given that 
institutions are very likely to be endogenous. Chemin (2009) is able to identify the direction of 
causality since he collects data before and after a major reform of the judiciary that took place 
                                                            
2 The ratio of new business formation is just one of the possible variables that can be employed to measure 
entrepreneurship. For an explanation of the trade-off between alternative measures and for the reason why we 
chose to employ this particular measure in this paper, see Section 3.1 below. 
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in Pakistan in 2002, so that he can estimate the impact of the reform. We too face the issue of 
endogeneity in our study and we control for it using a GMM model opportunely instrumented. 
Chemin (2009) finds that the reform had a strong and statistically significant impact on the 
entry rate of new firms, which resulted in an increase in Pakistan’s GDP by 0.5%. Garcia-
Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2014) study the case of Spain, showing that higher judicial 
efficacy (measured with the congestion rate of courts) has a positive impact on the entry of new 
firms, while it leaves the exit rate unaltered. Interestingly, the positive effect is found for new 
entrepreneurial firms (and self-employed entrepreneurs) but not for limited liability 
corporations. The authors explain their finding hypothesizing that judicial inefficiency can be 
regarded as a fixed cost and is therefore less important the larger the firm. By securing property 
rights and enforcing contracts, the justice system is a commitment device that guarantees the 
return to entrepreneurial activities and creates the conditions for the development of viable 
credit markets. Lichand and Soares (2014) consider the link between an increased access to 
justice and entrepreneurship (defined as occupation as employer or self-employer) in Brazil in 
the 1990s. They find that better access to justice affects entrepreneurship positively among 
individuals with higher level of education but not among those with lower educational levels. 
Since education is a proxy of wealth, the result seems to indicate that judicial change in Brazil 
pushed towards entrepreneurial activities wealthier individuals. 
The studies presented so far are relative to specific countries. General empirical studies on 
entrepreneurship and institutions are, among others Desai et al. (2005), Scarpetta et al. (2002), 
Stephen et al. (2009) and Van Stel et al. (2007). Desai et al. (2005) consider the link between 
institutions and entrepreneurial activity across Europe. They show that all institutional factors 
that affect credit markets have a significant impact on entrepreneurship in the emerging 
markets but not in the mature countries of Europe. Moreover, the same political and 
institutional factors affect firms’ entry and growth, particularly of those subject to capital 
constraints and operating in less developed markets.3 Scarpetta et al. (2002) show that product 
market regulations, hiring and firing costs, heavy regulations on entrepreneurial activity have a 
significant, negative impact on the entry of new small firms and, more generally, on firms’ 
productivity. Stephen et al. (2009) look, more specifically, at the effect of working time 
regulations on entrepreneurship. Finally, Van Stel et al. (2007) look at the relationship between 
regulation and entrepreneurship. 
                                                            
3 On the important relation between access to credit, liquidity constraints and entrepreneurship, see Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989). 
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Corruption and a low endowment of moral awareness do not necessarily affect the rate of 
new firm formation, but rather shape the way entrepreneurial activities are carried out. This 
finding is obtained looking at the impact of the control of corruption on entrepreneurial activity 
(Anokhin and Schulze, 2009), at the moral awareness of entrepreneurs (Bryant,2009), and at 
the influence exerted by the lower efficiency of financial and legal institutions and the lack of 
their enforcement4 on the likelihood of entrepreneurs to engage in corruption (Tonoyan et al., 
2010). 
Literature has also studied the link between entrepreneurship and bankruptcy law (Armour 
and Cumming, 2008; Lee et al., 2007 and 2011; Peng et al., 2010). Unsurprisingly, this 
literature shows that bankruptcy laws that facilitate entrepreneurial exit positively impact 
entrepreneurship in a country. 
 
3. The Theoretical Underpinnings of the Effects of Constitutions on Entrepreneurship 
Several factors affect the dynamics of entrepreneurship according to the literature. We have 
chosen aspects of constitutions that directly affect the main variables the literature on 
entrepreneurship has indicated as highly significant for the development of entrepreneurial 
firms in an economy. 
We test the impact of a set of institutional variables that define the economic environment of 
a country. Particularly, we consider the protection of economic rights, the protection of the 
environment, the consideration and protection of ethnic diversity, and provisions regarding 
education. 
The relationship between education and entrepreneurship has been studied in the literature, 
with special attention to the link between human capital and individual entrepreneurs’ earnings. 
This literature is somehow linked to the endogenous growth literature, stressing how 
investments in human capital, innovation and, more generally, knowledge, foster economic 
growth.5  Several studies estimate the rate of return for entrepreneurs of an extra year of 
education but the conclusions of these studies often diverge. There is a general, anecdotal belief 
that too much education jeopardizes entrepreneurial creativity. Very successful entrepreneurs 
often dropped out of college or even of high school (Parker, 2009). Signaling theory provides 
yet another explanation why entrepreneurs might get less education than employees. In a world 
of asymmetric information where abilities are private information, perspective employees try to 
                                                            
4 In this connection, it is likely that in most countries excessive time for interpreting regulations for business 
increases an entrepreneur’s likelihood of becoming involved in corruption 
5 For a general and complete overview of endogenous growth theories see Aghion and Howitt (1997). 
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signal their quality in the job market by acquiring more education (Spence, 1973). Since 
entrepreneurs do not need signaling since they do not seek a potential employer but are self-
employed, they have little incentives to invest in the formation of their human capital (Riley, 
1979).  These theories however explain why prospective entrepreneurs tend to invest little in 
education; they do not explain why education might have a low impact on entrepreneurs’ 
earnings. Orzach and Tauman (2005) elaborate on signaling theories, presenting a model in 
which individual ability is two-dimensional: there is human capital derived from education and 
entrepreneurial talent. While the former is publicly observable, the latter is private information. 
People highly gifted in entrepreneurial talent signal such characteristic by investing little in 
education, thus somehow “committing” themselves not to look for a job as employees. This 
would be a losing strategy for untalented individuals. Therefore it represents a good signal to 
lenders. By gaining a preferential lane in the credit market, given their talent, these 
entrepreneurs have high chances of success and therefore high earnings.  
According to these theories, we should expect that public investment in education has little 
if no impact on entrepreneurship. In any case, such impact should be negative. If a constitution 
contains provisions about education, the sign and size of their impact on entrepreneurship 
should be consistent to that just said. Particularly, in an occupational choice model, if education 
has low returns to entrepreneurship, we should find that education and de jure and de facto 
provisions about it impact negatively the rate of new business formation. 
Is previous empirical analysis validating these theories? Apparently not, since, in general 
there seems to be a positive relationship between education and earnings from 
entrepreneurship, particularly when the endogeneity of educational choice is taken into account 
and an instrumental variables approach is taken. The impact of education is higher in developed 
countries than in developing ones. Moreover, on average, there seems to be the same return to 
education for the self-employed and for employees (see Parker 2009 and other studies reported 
therein). 
Other theories have been proposed to assess the link between education and entrepreneurial 
earnings and they suggest a relationship that has the opposite sign compared to the theories 
presented above. These latter studies are therefore more in line with the empirical evidence just 
presented. Some studies argue that entrepreneurs too are screened by lenders, customers, etc. 
Therefore, in an adverse selection environment, they have possibly as much incentive to invest 
in education as employees (Parker and van Praag, 2006). Moreover, formal education might 
enhance the productivity of the self-employed, as well as that of employees (van Praag, 2005).     
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In this paper, we consider three characteristics of constitutions related to education. We 
consider whether the constitution has general provisions concerning education (which means 
whether there are provisions in the constitution mentioning education, independent of their 
content), whether the constitution guarantees equal access to higher education and, finally, to 
what level (or year of age) the constitution makes education compulsory. 
Given the evidence presented above about the impact of education on entrepreneurship, we 
formulate the following hypothesis. 
H1: The presence of special provisions regarding equal access, compulsory education and, 
more generally, rights to education in a country’s constitution exerts a positive impact on 
the rate of new business formation.  
The presence of ethnic minorities in a country and immigration has been a highly debated 
issue in the literature on entrepreneurship. A first, important question is whether the presence of 
various ethnicities has a positive impact on entrepreneurship. Literature has pointed out 
positive and negative effects of the coexistence of different ethnicities on entrepreneurship (See 
Parker, 2009). Generally, there is evidence that members of ethnic minority groups are subject 
to discrimination in paid employment, in the market for capital and in the product market. The 
first and the last types of discrimination would typically encourage entrepreneurship, whereas 
the last would impede it. Empirical studies find mixed evidence about the sign of the impact of 
discrimination on ethnic entrepreneurship, possibly showing that all these factors are at play 
and counteract each other. Discrimination in paid employment increases the attractiveness of 
self-employment for members of the minority group. Similarly, the presence of discrimination 
in the product market may facilitate self-employment within minorities. Ethnic group may 
constitute enclaves in which individuals support each other economically. Within such 
enclaves, there might be protected niche markets catering for special needs like special clothing 
and food, religious goods and services. Entrepreneurs belonging to the specific ethnic group are 
likely to have better capacity to cater for such special needs. Clearly, discrimination in the 
capital market hits negatively on entrepreneurship (although it may favor the establishment of 
banks and other financial institutions founded by members of the discriminated group). 
In theory, if the legal system of a country contains special provisions concerning the 
integration of ethnic minorities, such provisions would probably have the effect of reducing 
discrimination. As a result we could expect a positive impact on entrepreneurship if the 
negative effects of discrimination on entrepreneurship were predominant and a negative impact 
otherwise. As the negative elements seem to be predominant in importance and number 
(product market discrimination implies smaller markets for minority entrepreneurs and capital 
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market discrimination substantially reduce the opportunities to develop large firms) we 
formulate the following hypothesis. 
H2: The presence of constitutional provisions aiming at reducing ethnic fractionalization 
positively impacts on new business formation. 
We then study the impact of two institutional characteristics that are likely to heavily and 
negatively impact the rate of formation of new businesses. 
We first consider whether the constitution mentions the adoption of national economic 
plans. In a planned economy, private initiative has very little space to develop, which is likely 
to jeopardize entrepreneurial spirit. 
H3: If a constitution mentions the adoption of national economic plans, the rate of new 
business formation is reduced. 
We then consider whether a constitution explicitly refers to the protection and preservation 
of the environment. This is likely to result in the adoption of regulations constraining the 
behavior of firms, specifically requiring them to adopt costly procedures to avoid pollution. 
Such procedures are generally characterized by economies of scale and therefore impact 
negatively on the profitability of small firms in particular. 
H4: If a constitution explicitly mentions environmental concerns, the rate of new business 
formation is reduced. 
Finally, we consider a group of variables classified in the dataset under the heading 
“Economic Rights”. In this group, we find variables of different nature. The characteristic they 
share is their direct relationship with institutional aspects that are intrinsically connected to 
specific economic rights. 
We include variables related to property rights and their use. In this subgroup we find 
variables like the presence of constitutional provisions for the right to transfer property freely 
inter vivos, the right to transfer property freely post mortem and the right to inherit.  To our 
knowledge, we are the first to study the relationship between these characteristics of property 
rights and entrepreneurship. Our interest in these variables can be motivated as follows. 
The right to transfer property freely inter vivos is a proxy for the existence of a secondary 
market for enterprises. In this respect, the presence of such legal provision represents a form of 
insurance for prospective entrepreneurs willing to invest in a new business venture. It also 
represents an institutional setting in which the value of an entrepreneurial venture can be 
established. A very successful enterprise can be transferred to new owners for a high price with 
low transaction costs, whereas some value can be extracted from an unsuccessful one, be that 
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only the value of the assets sold separately. In either case, the existence of such right is deemed 
to have a positive effect on entrepreneurship. 
Similarly, the right to transfer property freely post mortem formalizes the possibility to 
transfer the control of the business to people not belonging to the entrepreneur’s family of 
origin. This should guarantee the best use of economic resources, enhancing the value of the 
firm, with consequent positive effects on the rate of return on the entrepreneur’s investment and 
an increase in the rate of formation of new businesses. 
Finally, the possibility to inherit is a right that complements the right to transfer property 
freely post mortem and is expected to have the same effects on entrepreneurship. 
H5: If a constitution establishes clear norms to transfer property pre and post mortem, the 
rate of formation of new businesses increases. 
The protection of intellectual property rights is another factor of utmost importance for the 
formation and development of new firms. Literature has particularly stressed the role played by 
patents. In this paper, we also include trademarks and copyright. 
Patents play an ambiguous role on the development of entrepreneurship. On the one hand, 
they have a positive value, in that they guarantee the just remuneration of R&D investment. 
This fosters the establishment of new start-ups and of new small, highly technological firms. It 
is in fact widely recognized that many, radical innovations come from new start-ups (Zucker et 
al, 1998; Jorgenson, 2001). As a result, the rate of new firm formation should be positively 
impacted. On the other hand, however, a country with a strong protection of intellectual 
property is likely to be a mature country, relatively close to the technological frontier (Della 
Malva and Santarelli, 2014). The possibilities to innovate for new entrant firms are therefore 
limited, which implies a negative impact of patents on the rate of new firm formation (Acs et 
al., 2009). 
It is interesting to consider copyright and its relationship with new firm formation. 
Traditionally, literature has disregarded it, since copyright typically protects literary, musical, 
artistic intellectual work. However, in most countries copyright protects computer software, 
and the software industry has been highly characterized by entry by start-ups (Zucker et al., 
1998). Strong copyright protection has therefore encouraged on the one hand but limited on the 
other the development of new start-ups. The latter, negative effect is most likely to have bitten 
where small firms prospered by adapting existing software to the needs of other firms and 
private customers. 
Trademark is a form of intellectual property protection that has received little attention in 
the literature on entrepreneurship. A trademark “is a word, symbol, or other signifier used to 
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distinguish a good or service produced by one firm from the goods or services of other firms” 
(Landes and Posner, 1987). Trademarks therefore help firms to differentiate their products, 
creating market niches and inducing customer loyalty. They also help reducing consumers 
search costs, by allowing firms to build a reputation for the quality of their goods and services. 
Clearly, such function requires the legal protection of trademarks. If competitors could freely 
use the word or symbol used to identify a firm’s product or service, they could free ride on a 
firm’s investment in reputation building (Landes and Posner, 1987). That just said implies that 
the impact of trademarks protection has a positive sign on entrepreneurship. 
We consider three indicators, stating whether a country’s constitution contains provisions 
for the protection of intellectual property, in the form of patents, copyright and trademarks. We 
hypothesize that patent and copyright protection negatively impact entrepreneurship. Our 
sample in fact includes all new firms, operating in all sectors, highly innovative and not. As 
mentioned above, only highly innovative sectors tend to benefit from strong protection of 
intellectual property, as this allows full exploitation of investment in R&D. Other sectors are 
constrained by IPR’s, that prevent spillovers (Acs et a.l, 2009).  Being non-innovative sectors 
the majority, we believe that in our sample negative effects prevail.6 Conversely, we believe 
that the impact of trademarks on entrepreneurship is positive. Hence: 
H6: The protection of intellectual property rights in the constitution has a differential 
effect on the rate of new firm formation. Particularly, patents and copyright impact 
negatively, whereas trademarks exert a positive effect. 
Furthermore, we consider other institutional characteristics that might facilitate new firm 
formation. We analyze whether the explicit inclusion in the legal system of a provision 
protecting the right to a free and competitive market facilitates entrepreneurship. We consider 
whether the constitution mentions the right to establish and conduct a business. Both these 
rights should exert a positive impact on entrepreneurship. 
H7: The protection of market freedom and of the right to establish and conduct a 
business has a positive effect on entrepreneurship. 
Finally, we consider factors that should depress the rate of new firm formation. The right to 
strike should reduce productivity of firms, thus reducing entrepreneurship.  
                                                            
6  In order to analyze the impact of IPR’s on entrepreneurship, we could divide our sample per sectors, 
separating highly innovative sectors from other sectors. We should then observe a positive impact on the former 
sectors and a negative impact on the latter. This study is however beyond the scope of our paper and is left for 
future research. 
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The right to a fair remuneration of work should also depress entrepreneurship, since it 
increases labor costs (such right might be often linked to the presence of a minimum wage 
regulation in the labor market).  
The explicit mention of consumer protection should again have a negative impact, since in 
practice is likely to force complex and costly warranty contracts and in general pushes firms to 
provide high quality.  
H8: Explicit constitutional protection of rights to strike, fair remuneration and 
consumers rights negatively impact entrepreneurship. 
Another factor that is likely to have a negative impact on the rate of formation of new firms 
is corruption. In a very corrupt country it may be very costly to set up a new firm: bribes might 
be necessary to “oil the system”. Moreover, generally there is a positive correlation between the 
complexity of bureaucratic rules and the amount of red tape and corruption.7 If a constitution 
contains provisions regarding corruption, special attention is possibly devoted to contain its 
effects and to enforce anti-corruption measures. However, the measures of corruption control 
we consider regard the existence and the functioning of a counter-corruption commission.8 
Such measures can therefore be considered as a regulatory burden imposed to firms in general 
and to new start-ups in particular. This is highly likely to reduce the rate of formation of new 
firms (Djankov et al., 2002). Particularly, it is likely to limit the entry of new firms in legal 
sectors. As pointed out by Baumol (1990), too heavy regulation increase barriers to entry but 
this, rather than discourage entrepreneurs, determine their decision to remain in the gray sector. 
H9: The anti-corruption provisions in a constitution decrease entrepreneurship. 
 
4. Data Description and Empirical Strategy 
The source of information about the characteristics of constitutions, our de jure determinants 
of entrepreneurship, is represented by the Comparative Constitutions Project: A Cross-National 
Historical Dataset of Written Constitutions (henceforth CCP) (Elkins et al., 2009), a repository 
of valuable data on the formal characteristics of written constitutions for most independent 
states since 1789. Initially funded by the National Science Foundation and the Cline Center for 
Democracy at the University of Illinois, the CCP has subsequently (in 2013) developed into the 
Constitute project, a joint initiative with Google Ideas aimed at providing an indexed repository 
                                                            
7 See Mauro (1995) for the relationship between corruption and growth. Since entrepreneurship has been identified 
as one of the main engines of economic growth (see, among others, Baumol, 2010), a negative impact of 
corruption on entrepreneurship might be one of the channels explaining the negative impact of corruption on 
growth. 
8 Within constitutions, corruption is mentioned together with other regulatory provisions. Therefore, provisions 
regarding corruption deal with regulatory burdens imposed to control bribery, grafts and other behavior by 
bureaucrats. 
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of constitutional text for every constitution currently in force. The CCP contains data on both 
form and content of constitutions and tracks their main revisions over time. It is divided into 14 
sections, each of which dealing with general and specific provisions contained in a national 
constitution. For our analysis we used information from Sections 9.5 (Corruption), 13.5 
(Economic Rights), 14.1 (Environment), 14.5 (Economic Legislation), 14.6 (Race, Ethnicity, 
and Language), and 14.7 (Education).  
In relation to the variables aimed at capturing the effect of cultural, economic, and 
technological characteristics of a country on the overall process of new firm formation, our de 
facto determinants of entrepreneurship, we relied upon the World Bank Development 
Indicators and the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.  
 
3.1 Dependent and independent variables 
Entrepreneurship capital involves a national milieu of agents who are willing to create new 
firms. Thus, a high entry rate of new firm formation may signal a greater endowment of 
entrepreneurship capital or a positive attitude towards self-employment. In the empirical 
literature on entrepreneurship, the rate of new firm formation and the endowment of 
entrepreneurship capital have been measured in different ways (for a survey, cf. Santarelli and 
Vivarelli, 2007).  This literature has also shown that the employment of different measures of 
new firm formation may produce strikingly different results in empirical analyses. In particular, 
two alternative approaches can be adopted to compare start-up rates across different units of 
analysis (for a survey, see Santarelli et al., 2009): the ecological and the labor market 
approach.  
The ecological approach standardizes the number of entrants relative to that of active firms, 
the aim being to capture the magnitude of start-up activity in relation to the size of the existing 
population of businesses. Thus, this index can be viewed as the ratio between the founders of 
new firms and existing entrepreneurs. The labor market approach standardizes the number of 
new firms with respect to the size of the workforce or working age population. It implicitly 
assumes that all firms are the result of individual actions, since new entrepreneurs can be 
viewed as individuals previously either having or being potentially interested in having a 
dependent job, who exploit their knowledge of production processes and market features to 
switch to independent work (Santarelli and Sterlacchini, 1994). Accordingly, each individual in 
the labor pool is considered as a potential entrepreneur, with the potentiality to set up his own 
business (Audretsch and Fritsch, 1994). We believe that the labor market approach is the best 
way to study a country’s attitude towards entrepreneurship. Accordingly, using data from the 
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World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database9, the dependent variable is a standard measure 
of the total start-up activity in a country proxied by new business density (NBD), i.e. the 
number of new business registrations (private, formal sector companies with limited liability) 
in every year in each country per 1,000 residents aged 15-64. The independent variables are 
listed and described in Table 1. Thus our measure is different from that employed by Acs et al. 
(2009), who used self-employed as a percentage of the labor force in their study of the 
relationship between knowledge spillovers and entrepreneurship in OECD countries. 
 
Table 1 - List of independent variables 
Variable description Code 
Corruption 
Constitution contains provisions for a counter corruption commission CC 
Economic legislation 
Adoption of national economic plans Econplan 
Economic rights 
Right to transfer property freely Transfer 
Inheritance rights Inherit 
Right to free/competitive markets Freecomp 
Right to conduct/establish a business Business 
Right to strike Strike 
Consumer protection Conright 
Right to transfer property freely after death Testate 
Just remuneration for work mentioned Remuner 
Intellectual property rights – patents Intprop_1 
Intellectual property rights – copyright Intprop_2 
Intellectual property rights – trademark Intprop_3 
Environment 
Protection or preservation of the environment Env 
Race, ethnicity, and language 
Provisions for national integration of ethnic communities Ethincl 
Education 
Equal access to higher education Achighed 
To what level compulsory education Edcompl 
Constitution contains provisions concerning education Educate 
Control variables 
Corruption perception index Cpi 
Labor force participation rate (% of total population +15 years old) Laborforce 
Government size: the ratio of public expenditure over GDP Govsize 
Percentage of internet users (reflecting infrastructure) Internetuser 
GDP per capita GDPcapita 
 
They capture principles clearly stated in the constitutions, for each of which one or more 
proxies have been used. Since we only consider whether such principles are specifically 
introduced in the constitution, the corresponding variables are dummies attaining value 1 if the 
principle is mentioned in the constitution and zero otherwise. To control for country-specific 
characteristics that are likely to either stimulate or limit the endowment of entrepreneurship 
                                                            
9 Since the US economy is not covered by the database, we decided to exclude this country from analysis rather 
than extracting the relevant data from alternative sources. 
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capital/new business density, we first consider for each country four aspects: the perceived 
level of corruption as reported by Transparency International (Cpi), as a measure of the 
potentially negative impact of the abuse of public or collective responsibility for private ends 
(Bardhan, 1997); the labor force participation (for population aged 15+) (Laborforce), under 
the assumption that since the largest fractions of new entrepreneurs is represented by 
individuals previously employed as wage workers higher levels of this variable should be 
associated to higher rates of new business density (Storey and Jones, 1987); the ratio of public 
expenditures over GDP (Govsize), as a proxy of of total tax pressure and the extent of 
regulatory interventions in the economy (Acs et al., 2009); a measure of the quality of the 
infrastructures represented by the percentage of internet users (Internetuser), to detect whether 
entrepreneurs do or do not start firms before a critical mass of a strategic infrastructure is 
accumulated. Besides, in order to shed light on the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
the business cycle, we estimate also a model in which the measure of GDP per capita 
(GDPcapita) is added as a control variable. The measure of GDP per capita - converted into 
current international US $ using purchasing power parity rates - is drawn from the World Bank 
databases. 
 
3.2 Model development and estimation method 
Our baseline model includes both de jure, characteristics of the constitutions, and de facto, 
country-specific characteristics, factors that may stimulate firm entries: 
 
(1)  NBDit = 0 + 1CCit + 2ECONPLANit + 3ECRIGHTSit + 4ENVit + 5RACEit + 
6ETHINCLit + EDUit +  Zit + it + it        
 (i = 1, 2, …, n; t = 1, 2, …, T). 
 
CC is a dummy variable coded 1 if the constitutions contain provisions for a counter 
corruption commission, ECONPLAN a dummy variable coded 1 if the constitutions recommend 
adoption of national economic plans, ECRIGHTS is a set of 11 dummy variables coded 1 if the 
constitutions explicitly mention the protection of certain economic rights, ENV is a dummy 
variable coded 1 if the constitutions mention the adoption of measures for protection or 
preservation of the environment, ETHINCL is a dummy variable coded 1 if the constitutions 
contain provisions for national integration of ethnic communities, EDU is a set of 2 dummy 
variables coded 1 if the constitutions contains certain provisions in relation to education and a 
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variable (Edcompl) indicating to what level education is made compulsory in the constitution10, 
Z is a set of 4 controls for country-specific characteristics, is a unobserved country-specific 
time-invariant effect that allows for heterogeneity in the means of the NBDti series across 
countries, and  is a disturbance term. 
In the Appendix, Tables A.2 and A.3 report respectively the correlation matrix and the 
descriptive statistics. The dependent variable exhibits a correlation above 0.40 only with Cpi 
and Internetuser. Correlation among the explanatory variables is a source of little concern, 
although there are some correlations above 0.4: Conright with Freecomp, Strike with Remuner, 
Env with Remuner, Cpi with Internetuser, Intprop_1 with Intprop_2, and Intprop_1 with 
Intprop_3. However, since the last three pairs of variables display correlations above 0.5, they 
have been inserted separately in the estimations.  
Before estimating the Pooled OLS regression, the Breusch-Pagan’s test is employed to 
check for the presence of heteroskedasticity (chi2(1) = 641.85; Prob > chi2 = 0.0000). Thus, 
since the test confirms heteroskedasticity, the alternative estimation technique capable of 
correcting for heteroskedastic errors is “Robust” Pooled OLS regression method with standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity by White’s method. The results are presented in Table 2. 
We conduct serial correlation and endogeneity tests to check for the presence of 
autocorrelation and endogenous variables, which would yield biased estimations for a panel 
data structure. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data indicates the presence of 
serial correlation in our dataset11. Although endogeneity bias usually arises in cross-sectional 
studies, it is rarely considered as a factor hindering economic analysis in the case of panel data 
estimations like ours, since fixed effects estimation will eliminate most forms of unobserved 
heterogeneity. In any case, the Sargan test has been used to check whether endogeneity is likely 
to bias our estimation. In fact, the Sargan test indicates the presence of endogeneity of the 
Strike, Econplan, Env, Business, Intprop_112, Intprop_2, and Intprop_3 variables. In case of 
endogeneity problems, instrumental variable (IV) estimation is often adopted.  
Since both serial correlation and endogeneity problems are present in our data, even Robust 
Pooled OLS estimation fails to give unbiased and efficient estimators. Thus, to get more 
reliable results we apply the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic panel-data 
estimation using the conventionally derived variance estimator for generalized method of 
                                                            
10  This variable takes therefore value 0 when no provision about compulsory education is contained in the 
constitution, 1 when education is compulsory up to the basic/elementary/primary level, 2 when it is compulsory up 
to the secondary/intermediate level. 
11 F (1, 113) = 22.689; p-value=0.000 
12 ߯ଶሺ1ሻ ൌ 4.384; ݌ െ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ൌ 0.036 
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moments (GMM) technique (Baum and Schaffer, 2003; Blundell and Bond, 1998)13. The IV-
GMM treatment requires the availability and validity of exogenous instruments that are 
correlated with the independent variables for which endogeneity has been detected, but that are 
uncorrelated with the measure of new business density (NBD). We estimate a model where the 
lagged values of the endogenous variables are used as IVs14 and the lagged value of the 
dependent variable is also included to isolate the effect of potential performance shock that may 
impede or stimulate new entries:  
 
(2)  NBDit = BDit-1 + 1CCit + 2ECONPLANit + 3ECRIGHTSit + 4ENVit + 
5ETHINCLit + 6EDUit +  Zit + it + it       
  (i = 1, 2, …, n; t = 1, 2, …, T). 
 
Where NBDit-1 is the one-year lagged value of NBDit of country i  in year t. 
The results from IV-GMM estimation are presented  in Table 3. Those from the Pooled OLS 
and the IV-GMM incorporating also the GDPcapita variable can be found in Table A.4 in the 
Appendix. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
The findings from the Robust Pooled OLS regressions show that provisions for a counter 
corruption commission (CC), those in favor of the right to transfer property freely (Transfer), 
constitutional protection of the right to strike (Strike), right to free/competitive markets 
(Freecomp), and higher levels of compulsory education (Edcompl) are all factors enhancing the 
propensity to start up new businesses. Conversely, recommendations for the adoption of 
national economic plans (Econplan), the right to transfer property freely after death (Testate), 
provisions about protection or preservation of the environment (Env), generic provisions 
concerning education (Educate), are associated to lower levels of new business density.  
Less straightforward results are found for provisions concerning protection of intellectual 
property rights (Intprop_1, Intprop_2, and Intprop_3) and just remuneration of work 
(Remuner). For the former, only when all the variables are included in the model a positive and 
                                                            
13 We did check the robustness of our adopted model by re-run all regressions with the GMM model for the static 
treatment (ivreg2). However, the significant lagged value of the dependent variable in our dynamic treatment 
indicates the presence of strong relationship between new entries over years: new entry this year is strongly 
determined by new entry last year. Thus, the dynamic treatment is preferable.   
14 In fact, our constitution dummy variables present little variation over time, since during the relevant period 
several national constitutions have modified at least in part some of the provisions taken into account in the 
present study. 
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statistically significant coefficient is found for the provisions regarding patents alone 
(Intprop_1). For the latter, only when provisions concerning copyright (Intprop_2) and 
trademarks (Intprop_3) are excluded for the collinearity problems discussed above, does a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient of the Remuner variable turn out. As far as the 
control variables are concerned, once the problem of collinearity is duly treated they are all 
found to be positively and statistically significantly associated to new business density.  
However, since serial correlation and endogeneity have been seen to be a problem, our most 
interesting findings are those found from application of the dynamic IV-GMM method that in 
fact changes the picture with respect to the Pooled OLS (Table 3). Although the coefficients of 
the CC and the Freecomp variables are no longer significant, the sign and the statistical 
significance of most of the other estimated parameters are consistent with the hypotheses, and 
the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable NBDt-1 
supports our choice of the GMM treatment of the model. Starting with the estimate including 
all variables (first column of Table 3), we discuss the hypotheses we outlined in Section 3, 
checking whether our empirical analysis validates or negates them. 
We look first at the group of variables dealing with education. Hypothesis H1 posits that 
provisions regarding education have a positive impact on the rate of new business formation. 
Interestingly, we find that general constitutional provisions concerning education (Educate) 
have a positive impact on our measure of entrepreneurship, whereas provisions on equal access 
to higher education (Achighed) influence negatively the dependent variable. Finally, the degree 
to which the constitution prescribes education to be compulsory (Edcompl) has not a 
statistically significant impact on the rate of formation of new businesses.  All three findings 
provide support to the theories presented in Section 3. Particularly, education has a positive 
impact on the choice to become entrepreneurs, which confirms the results in van Praag (2005). 
This is also in line with the empirical literature on the returns to education for entrepreneurs: 
more education translates into higher earnings for entrepreneurs, which, in a model of 
occupational choice, might lead more individuals with relatively high entrepreneurial skills to 
choose self-employment. Equal access to higher education hinders entrepreneurship. This 
finding is apparently confirmed by anecdotal evidence, telling the stories of very talented 
entrepreneurs who dropped out of college or even of high school. The more you study, the 
argument goes, the more you learn rigid mental schemes and rational arguments that suffocate 
your creative skill (Parker, 2009). This seems to be especially true for higher education. 
Finally, compulsory schooling has a positive but not statistically significant impact on 
entrepreneurship (it has a positive and significant impact in our OLS model but not in our 
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GMM). The positive sign is again in line with the positive effect of general education on 
entrepreneurship. Since most countries make education compulsory up to 
secondary/intermediate level, we are dealing with a level of compulsory education that 
certainly impacts positively on individual skills and has little if no signaling/screening power. 
The lack of statistical significance in the GMM simply indicates that such a level of 
compulsory education cannot impact entrepreneurship in a differential measure compared to 
paid employment. 
Turning to our hypothesis H2, we find that constitutional provisions regarding ethnic 
integration (Ethincl) have a negative but not statistically significant impact on the rate of new 
business formation. This result could be explained by a series of factors. First of all, in Section 
3 we mentioned several positive and negative effects of discrimination on entrepreneurship. 
Our results seemingly indicate that positive effects are small and possibly overcome by 
negative ones. Moreover, the impact of the negative effects of discrimination might be small. 
For instance, the evidence about the difficulties that ethnic minorities encounter when they try 
to borrow in the US is mixed (Blanchard et al., 2008). Studies about the UK find no significant 
discrimination in the loan market (Fraser, 2007). 
Turning to economic legislation, countries which are forced by their constitutions to adopt 
national economic plans (Econplan) are the least entrepreneurially active, confirming our 
hypothesis H3 and that centrally planned economies are less able to provide incentives to 
business founders and are in general characterized by slower entrepreneurial dynamics than it is 
the case in free market economies. Consistently with the large and positive coefficient of the 
Business variable and the positive (albeit not significant) impact of the Freecomp variable – 
showing that pro-market institutional arrangements promote entrepreneurship and discussed 
below - the negative and statistically significant (at the 1 percent level) coefficient of Econplan 
confirms that when institutions do not support economic freedom entrepreneurship is severely 
impeded (Bell et al., 2008; Parker, 2009, Ch. 15). 
Provisions about protection or preservation of the environment do not facilitate 
entrepreneurship (confirming our Hypothesis H4): the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of the Env variable suggests that new firms are less likely to be able to face the 
increased costs brought about by severe environmental regulation.  
We then turn to the variables defining economic rights in our dataset. Variables proxying 
provisions about right to transfer property freely (Transfer), right to transfer property freely 
after death (Testate), and inheritance rights in general (Inherit) never get a statistically 
significant coefficient, with the only partial exception of Inherit (although only at a 90% 
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confidence level) in the estimate from which Intprop_2, Intprop_3, and Internetuser are 
dropped. Then our hypothesis H5 is generally negated, given that only Transfer tends to have a 
positive coefficient, whereas Testate and Inherit have a negative impact. Our findings indirectly 
support the view that the transition problem often facing entrepreneurial/family firms cannot be 
overcome by simply regulating transfers of property, since it is also linked to cultural (e.g. 
business founders reluctance to hand over control of their firm to an outsider) and structural 
(e.g. inefficiency of financial markets) factors (Burkart et al., 2003). 
When turning to intellectual property rights, results confirm our hypothesis H6. Particularly, 
copyright has a strong negative impact, whereas trademarks have a strong positive effect on the 
rate of new business formation. Both effects are statistically significant at a 99% confidence 
interval. The impact of patents is instead negative, again as expected, but only at a 90% 
confidence interval. This might be due to the fact that the majority of the newly formed firms in 
our sample operate in sectors hardly influenced by patents and knowledge spillovers, like retail 
and direct customer services. 
Intprop_3, denotes provisions about trademarks, which may imply that registrations of new 
brand names (new varieties of a product) are the preferred instrument for the protection of 
intellectual property rights by new firms outside the high-tech industries. In the law and 
economics literature, trademarks have been shown to be a “signal” which facilitates and 
enhances consumers’ decisions and creates incentives for firms to produce goods of desirable 
qualities (Landes and Posner, 1987; Economides, 1998). Trademarks are also a standard 
measure of the innovative performance of firms in traditional and intermediate industries, i.e. in 
industries in which the rate of new firm formation tends to be higher (cf. Mendonça et al., 
2004). 
Opposite to results from OLS estimations, but not surprisingly, patents and copyrights 
(Intprop_1 and Intprop_2) get negative and statistically significant coefficients. These variables 
capture the (potential) effect of technological development on new firm formation; however, 
since most of the technological activities that are likely to lead agents to apply for either patent 
or copyright protection are undertaken by a limited number of large firms in specific industries, 
Intprop_1 and Intprop_2 may not adequately reflect technological opportunities available to 
(very) small new firms (Santarelli et al., 2009). In fact, as a comment to their finding that 
patent activity is negatively associated to new firm formation in the USA Choi and Phan (2006) 
argue that patents are an indicator of venture success rather than a cause of firm formation. 
However, within a law and economics framework, trademarks are even more important than 
patents and copyright. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the Intprop_3 
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variable confirms that this mechanisms of Intellectual Property Rights protection, by averting 
the market failure brought about by adverse selection and providing information for assisting 
exchanges indirectly facilitates the overall process of new firm formation. 
Business has a positive and strongly significant coefficient, showing that provisions dealing 
with the right to conduct/establish a business lead to higher rates of entrepreneurship, since 
they protect the right to be an entrepreneur. The provisions denoted by the Business variable are 
typical of institutional settings aimed at protecting entrepreneurs from the risk of appropriation, 
which confirms our hypothesis H7. The variable Freecomp, however, is never statistically 
significant, even if it has a positive coefficient.  
Strike and Conright, denoting that right to strike (Strike) and consumer protection (Conright) 
are positively and significantly associated with new business density. Our results surprisingly 
contradict hypothesis H8. Strike has a remarkably strong and positive effect, highly significant. 
This might be due to the fact that strikes tend to occur in large companies more than in small 
ones, where industrial relations are based on personal and close interaction and family bonds 
and friendship often tie workers and ownership. Moreover, the fact that a constitution mentions 
the right to strike implies that ordinary laws will probably clearly regulate strikes, which 
renders industrial relations generally more transparent and less costly to manage. 
Conright is highly positive and strongly statistically significant. The main explanation for 
this finding might be that an economy with strong consumer protection is also characterized by 
high consumer trust and little incidence of lemons problems (Akerlof, 1970; Landes and 
Posner, 1985). Therefore, consumers are willing to buy from relatively young firms, which had 
little time to build a reputation for quality. This certainly facilitates the survival of new firms 
and therefore makes entry and entrepreneurship in general more attractive. Being the pillars of 
transparent and well regulated labor and product markets, these characteristics of constitutions 
promote higher rates of new firm formation. In particular, provisions about the right to strike 
are indication of an institutional setting able to promote a favorable climate in industrial 
relations. 
Since higher wages may result in a lower incentive either to switch from salary job to 
employment or to start-up a new firm, one might expect that the extension of constitutional 
guarantees to the just remuneration of work might result on lower rates of new firm formation. 
However, this hypothesis is not fully confirmed by our analysis. In fact, the Remuner variable 
denoting mention in the constitution of the right of just remuneration for work is negative and 
(barely) statistically significant only in the estimate from which Intprop_1 and Cpi are 
excluded. This result possibly has the same explanation provided for the variable Strike. 
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   Table 2: Characteristics of the Constitutions and Entrepreneurship (Pooled OLS with Robust Standard Errors) 
Dep. Var.: new 
business density           
Variables Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE 
Corruption           
Cc .4203 .2128** .5337 .1911*** .5523 .1895*** .3899 .2171* .3564 .2166* 
Economic legislation           
Econplan -1.3397 .1842*** -1.2903 .1914*** -1.2847 .1924*** -1.3732 .1720*** -1.3628 .1743*** 
Economic rights           
Transfer .8389 .3882*** .7625 .3904** .7457 .3999** .7899 .3856*** .7301 .3941** 
Inherit .0537 .2009 -.2174 .2061 -.2338 .2031 .0811 .1957 .0135 .1924 
Freecomp .4120 .2190** .3261 .2201 .3356 .2207 .4533 .2055*** .4919 .2077*** 
Business .2157 .3698 .3148 .3714 .3182 .3716 .2225 .3612 .2390 .3602 
Strike 1.9386 .3148*** 1.4938 .2880*** 1.5281 .3009*** 1.9576 .2906*** 1.9987 .3035*** 
Conright -.0963 .2188 -.0870 .2264 -0.7887 .2288 -.0511 .2118 -.0181 .2154 
Testate -1.0986 .4207*** -.8971 .4239*** -.8862 .4082*** -1.1944 .4333*** -1.1784 .4188*** 
Remuner -1050 .2191 .0820 .1986 .1112 .2092 .0875 .2059 .1605 .2138 
Intprop_1 .6326 .3340** .2848 .2748   .5486 .2652***   
Intprop_2 -.1693 .2532   .1184 .2154   .1432 .2111 
Intprop_3 .0886 .4673   .3543 .4717   .2997 .4542 
Environment           
Env -3.6118 .4131*** -3.9503 .4331*** -3.9852 .4182*** -3.6251 .4191*** -3.7022 .4014*** 
Race, ethn. & lang.           
Ethincl .3951 .1769*** .2064 .1761 .2019 .1759 .5325 .1793*** .4425 .1794*** 
Education           
Achighed -.4311 .3198 -.4844 .3394 -.5280 .3271* -.4109 .3199 -.4682 .3099 
Edcompl .6286 .1509*** .6615 .1562 .6542 .1577*** .5992 .1480*** .5909 .1492*** 
Educate -2.2326 .4998*** -2.1996 .5289*** -2.2017 .5327*** -2.2579 .4870*** -2.2161 .4902*** 
Control variables           
Cpi .7060 .0857***     .7820 .0487*** .7770 .0497*** 
Laborforce .0274 .0083*** .0449 .0087*** .0456 .0086*** .0259 .0083** .0269 .0081*** 
Govsize .0562 .0095*** .0669 .0123*** .0670 .0128*** .0558 .0098*** .0543 .0101*** 
Internetuser .0077 .0063 .0495 .0037*** .0496 .0037***     
Intercept .1949 .7129 1.3073 .7532* 1.2678 .7535* .2287 .7162 .2443 .7185 
F (22, 97)= 31.20  (19, 1100) =34.86  (20,199)=32.48  (19,1106)=34.90  (20,1105)=32.53  
R2 .4067  .3710  .3713  .4062  .4050  
Root MSE 3.2635  3.3556  3.3562  3.2536  3.2586  
N 1120  1120  1120  1126  1126  
Note: *: significant at 90% level; **: significant at 95% level; ***: significant at 99% level. 
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 Table 3: Characteristics of the Constitutions and Entrepreneurship (IV-GMM) 
Dep. Var.: new business density           
Variables Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
NBDt-1 .7754 .0274*** .7991 .0249*** .7942 .0255*** .7817 .0267*** .7592 .0276*** 
Corruption           
Cc -.1599 5305 -.1780 .4749 -.1576 .5414 -.2009 .4690 -.3374 .5329 
Economic legislation           
Econplan -2.0564 .5671*** -2.1185 .5542*** -2.3248 .5603*** -1.8884 .5567*** -2.0023 .5613*** 
Economic rights           
Transfer .2531 .5469 -.1285 .4885 .1238 .5072 .1119 .5059 .6156 .5260 
Inherit -.5555 .4761 -.7351 .4654 -.0905 .4568 -.7521 .4610* .0916 .4542 
Freecomp .0562 .5106 .5454 .4926 -.1400 .5145 .5274 .4880 -.0105 .5116 
Business .9386 .3963*** 1.3431 .4099*** 1.1282 .4049*** 1.2595 .4079*** 1.0798 .3999*** 
Strike 1.4268 .5224*** 1.4961 .5183*** 1.2861 .5185*** 1.4888 .5125*** 1.3454 .5098*** 
Conright 1.1129 .4957*** 1.1560 .4559*** 1.3186 .5213*** 1.0710 .4475*** 1.3551 .5153*** 
Testate -.0733 .6880 -.7761 .6318 -1.0285 .6927 -.6302 .6287 -1.1133 .6859* 
Remuner -.5452 .4751 -.7214 .4977 -.8226 .4839* -.5897 .4876 -.7317 .4730 
Intprop_1 -1.3872 .7757* -2.5677 .7289   -2.5991 .7632***   
Intprop_2 -2.2759 .8735***   -3.4251 .8457***   -3.8304 .8412*** 
Intprop_3 1.999 1.9703**   1.7915 1.0681*   1.7578 1.0525* 
Environment           
Env -2.2639 .5778*** -2.3018 .5777 -2.2986 .5707*** -2.3542 .5732*** -.2509 .5636*** 
Race, ethnicity and language           
Ethincl -.3094 .4838 -.9205 .4849 -.3263 .4433 -.7958 .4914 -.0511 .4478 
Education           
Achighed -1.5888 .5267*** -.8384 .5458 -1.0041 .5254** -.9957 .5507* -1.3390 .5298*** 
Edcompl .4357 .3743 .3782 .3953 .1274 .3766 .4169 .3893 .1770 .5298 
Educate 4.5748 1.3388*** 4.8906 1.3692*** 4.7631 1.3455*** 4.9066 1.3509*** 4.5710 1.3192*** 
Control variables           
Cpi .3065 .1163***     .1603 .1069 .3387 .1076*** 
Laborforce .0013 .0147 -.0037 .0150 0163 .0154 -.0057 .0149 .0135 .0151 
Govsize -.0094 .0176 -.0104 .0121 -.0167 .0199 -.0119 .0120 -.0132 .0118 
Internetuser -.0023 .0045 .0002 .0041 .0044 .0042     
           
Intercept -2.5131 1.5378* -1.4876 .0041 -2.2368 1.5458 -2.1034 1.5448 -3.3679 1.5627 
Wald chi2 3557.15  3329.60  3283.48  3405.80  3403.20  
Observations 1008  1008  1008  1014  1014  
Groups 113  113  113       114  114  
Note: *: significant at 90% level; **: significant at 95% level; ***: significant at 99% level. 
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Constitutional guarantees of equal access to higher education (Achighed) are found to 
impact negatively on the dependent variable. This finding provides indication of a potentially 
lower quality of education systems that do not give priority access to secondary and tertiary 
education to the most deserving individuals.  
Provisions for a counter-corruption commission (Cc) now get a statistically non-significant, 
negative coefficient. This finding therefore supports (albeit only weakly) our hypothesis H9. 
Cpi (the corruption perception index) is negatively correlated with Cc (r=0.156), therefore it 
seems that countries with a constitutional requirement for a counter-corruption commission 
also have high-perceived corruption. This is in line with the argument by Djankov et al. (2002) 
presented in Section 4: since regulation increases barriers to entry, legal entrepreneurship is 
likely to decrease (negative impact of Cc), and corruption increases (high Cpi, due to an 
increase in bribery to overcome regulatory constraints).   
Of the four control variables, only the corruption perception index (Cpi) gets a statistically 
significant and positive coefficient, although only in two of the three specifications in which it 
is included.  
This is substantially consistent with some of the papers surveyed in Section 2 above, 
showing that lower levels of corruption do not necessarily result in higher rates of new firm 
formation but that the opposite might hold true, in particular in countries where social 
acceptance of entrepreneurial activities is particularly high (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). 
Possibly, this might also imply a shift of investments from large firms to small ones.  
Finally, we perform our regressions adding GDP per capita. The results are presented in 
Table A.4: while the GDPcapita variable gets a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
it is not significant in the IV-GMM model. Consistent with the finding by Koellinger and 
Thurik (2012), this result confirms that on this aggregate level GDP cycles do not predict the 
entrepreneurial cycle. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper has provided evidence supporting the view that constitutions may influence the 
behavior of economic agents. Dealing with the issue of the institutional determinants of 
entrepreneurship, it has shown a) that some of the provisions contained in national constitutions 
that create favorable conditions for entrepreneurship are positively and significantly associated 
to a standard measure of entrepreneurial dynamics such as the rate of new business density, and 
b) that other provisions which may be likely to impose a burden on or to just limit 
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entrepreneurial freedom are found to be negatively and statistically significantly associated to 
new business density.  
In addition to a positive analysis, our findings may also have a normative function. We 
identified some of the principles that constitutions should include when fostering a high 
entrepreneurial dynamics is a priority. Particularly, provisions about the right to 
conduct/establish a business, the right to strike, consumer protection, protection of trademarks, 
and education promote higher rates of new firm formation and should therefore be given high 
stance.  
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Appendix 1 – List of countries15 
Canada; Dominican Republic; Jamaica; Mexico; Belize; Guatemala; El Salvador; Costa Rica; Panama; 
Colombia; Peru; Brazil; Bolivia; Chile; Argentina; Uruguay; United Kingdom; Ireland; Netherlands; Belgium; 
Luxembourg; France; Switzerland; Spain; Portugal; Germany; Poland; Austria; Hungary; Czech Republic; Slovak 
Republic; Italy; Malta; Albania; Montenegro; Macedonia; Croatia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Slovenia; Greece; 
Cyprus; Bulgaria; Moldova; Romania; Russia; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania; Ukraine; Belarus; Armenia; Georgia; 
Azerbaijan; Finland; Sweden; Norway; Denmark; Iceland; Niger; Burkina Faso; Sierra Leone; Ghana; Togo; 
Nigeria; Gabon; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Uganda; Kenya; Rwanda; Ethiopia; Zambia; Malawi; South 
Africa; Namibia; Lesotho; Botswana; Madagascar; Mauritius; Morocco; Algeria; Tunisia; Turkey; Iraq; Egypt; 
Syria; Jordan; Israel; Qatar; United Arab Emirates; Oman; Tajikistan; Kyrgyz Republic; Kazakhstan; South Korea; 
Japan; India; Bhutan; Pakistan; Bangladesh; Sri Lanka; Maldives; Nepal; Thailand; Cambodia; Laos; Malaysia; 
Singapore; Brunei; Philippines; Indonesia; Timor; Australia; New Zealand; Vanuatu; Tonga. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
15 The Worl Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database covers 132 countries, but for 17 of them information on either 
the constitution or the control variables was not available. They have therefore been dropped from analysis. 
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Table A.2 – Pairwise correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1 1.000                        
2 -0.085 1.000                       
3 -0.196 -0.035 1.000                      
4 -0.005 0.068  0.039 1.000                                        
5 -0.069 -0.038 0.206 0.132 1.000                    
6 0.0002 -0.021 0.025 0.151 0.274 1.000                   
7 -0.081 -0.066 0.052 0.115 0.264 0.299 1.000                  
8 -0.078 -0.128 0.173 0.153 0.125 0.372 0.362 1.000                 
9 -0.084 -0.030 0.252 0.134 0.146 0.430 0.214 0.394 1.000                
10 0.087 0.041 0.067 0.425 0.063 0.209 0.190 0.216 0.224 1.000               
11 0.381 -0.011 0.286  0.051 0.208 0.292 0.225 0.419 0.300 0.911 1.000              
12 -0.013 -0.119 0.112 -0.025 -0.031 0.150 0.112 0.110 0.248 0.028 0.203 1.000             
13 0.098 -0.141 0.042 0.073 0.067 0.249 0.161 0.166 0.269 0.154 0.157 0.718 1.000            
14 -0.025 -0.070 0.147 -0.021 -0.062 0.048 0.101 0.056 0.139 -0.083 0.140 0.538 0.391 1.000           
15 -0.389 0.053 0.126 0.092 0.165 0.234 0.329 0.381 0.274 0.130 0.439 0.086 0.155 0.061 1.000          
16 -0.063 0.047 -0.048 -0.069 0.121 0.242 0.205 0.107 0.166 0.017 0.171 0.095 0.083 0.083 0.203 1.000         
17 -0.085 -0.036 0.155 0.082 0.078 0.201 0.320 0.266 0.204 0.056 0.244 0.031 0.042 0.160 0.220 0.056 1.000        
18 -0.104 0.013 0.198 0.053 0.140 0.247 0.259 0.351 0.312 0.087 0.381 0.185 0.187 0.190 0.291 0.227 0.312 1.000       
19 -0.145 0.083 0.151 0.088 0.164 0.161 0.169 0.262 0.166 0.095 0.260 0.096 0.135 0.086 0.266 0.160 0.186 0.248 1.000      
20 0.465 -0.060 -0.156 -0.076 -0.062 -0.043 -0.173 -0.222 -0.134 -0.064 -0.276 -0.075 -0.004 -0.043 -0.322 -0.051 -0.036 -0.205 -0.211 1.000     
21 -0.006 0.090 0.062 0.114 -0.044 -0.022 -0.105 -0.002 -0.026 0.068 0.113 0.025 -0.039 -0.019 0.152 -0.004 -0.068 0.015 0.040 0.046 1.000    
22 0.166 -0.062 -0.041 0.109 -0.025 -0.013 -0.094 -0.057 -0.001 0.106 -0.114 -0.135 -0.050 -0.096 -0.046 -0.098 -0.015 -0.180 -0.068 0.217 -0.172 1.000   
23 0.434 -0.077 -0.192 -0.092 0.053 0.085 -0.073 -0.091 -0.011 -0.097 -0.190 0.025 0.077 -0.012 -0.202 0.046 0.007 -0.122 -0.136 0.816 -0.050 0.186 1.000  
24 -0.058 0.149 -0.012 -0.032 0.010 -0.039 -0.041 -0.057 -0.041 -0.023 -0.001 -0.036 -0.043 -0.022 0.043 -0.017 -0.047 0.119 0.024 -0.079 0.007 -0.044 -0.057 1.000 
List of variables: 1) NBD; 2) Cc; 3) Econplan; 4) Transfer; 5) Inherit; 6) Freecomp; 7) Business; 8)  Strike; 9) Conright; 10) Testate; 11) Remuner; 12) IntProp_1; 13) IntProp_2; 14) IntProp_3; 
15) Env; 16) Ethinc; 17) Achighed; 18) Edcompl; 19) Educate; 20) Cpi; 21) Laborforce; 22) Govsize; 23) Internetuser; 24) GDPcapita
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Table A.3 – Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
NBD 3.0591 4.9480 0 1 
Cc .0650 .2467 0 1 
Econplan .1878 .3907 0 1 
Transfer .1613 .3679 0 1 
Inherit .2976 .4573 0 1 
Freecomp .2086 .4064 0 1 
Business .3767 .4847 0 1 
Strike .4744 .4995 0 1 
Conright .2194 .4139 0 1 
Testate .0841 .2777 0 1 
Remuner .4750 .4995 0 1 
Intprop_1 .1767 .3816 0 1 
Intprop_2 .2446 .4299 0 1 
Intprop_3 .0699 .2552 0 1 
Env .7544 .4305 0 1 
Ethincl .2083 .4062 0 1 
Achighed .2601 .4388 0 1 
Edcompl .4992 .6362 0 2 
Educate .9105 .2855 0 1 
Cpi 4.1045 2.0811 1 9.7 
Laborforce 62.2133 10.3816 30.5 89.6 
Govsize 16.1048 7.6404 2.0471 104.9 
Internetuser 28.9211 25.5237 .0243 96.21 
GDPcapita 1.87e+08 2.46e+09 281.1 4.08e+10 
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Table A.4 – Characteristics of the Constitutions and Entrepreneurship with control for  
GDP per capita included: (Pooled OLS with Robust Standard Errors, IV-GMM) 
 OLS  IV-GMM  
Variable Coefficient Robust S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
NBDt-1   .7752 .0274*** 
Cc .4265 0.2139*** -.1620 .5309 
Econplan -1.3374 .1841*** -2.0560 .5674*** 
Transfer .8427 .3886*** .2482 .5477 
Inherit .0481 .2014 -.5524 .4765 
Freecomp .4181 .2193** .0543 .5109 
Business .2158 .3698 .9442 .3973*** 
Strike 1.9491 .3168*** 1.4266 .5226*** 
Conright -.0988 .2189 1.1125 .4960*** 
Testate .1.1001 .4208*** -.0796 .6889 
Remuner .0977 .2199 -.5383 .4766 
Intprop_1 .6375 .3342** -1.3824 .7762* 
Intprop_2 -.1686 .2533 -2.2816 .8741*** 
Intprop_3 .0896 .4674 1.9996 1.0711** 
Env -3.6149 .4133*** -2.2691 .5785*** 
Ethincl .3987 .1769*** -.3031 .4847 
Achighed -.4244 .3197 -1.5881 .5271*** 
Edcompl .6241 .1506*** .4327 .3746 
Educate -2.2370 .4997*** 4.5777 1.3396*** 
GDPcapita 0.0002 .0007*** -.0005 -0002 
Cpi .7087 .0862*** .3074 .1164*** 
Laborforce .0274 .0083*** .0013 .0148 
Govsize .0563 .0096*** -.0095 .0177 
Internetuser .0075 .0063 -.0023 .0045 
Intercept .1860 .7133 -2.5185 1.5387* 
Wald Chi2   3382.44  
R2 .4068    
Root MSE 3.2646    
N 1120  1008  
Groups   113  
Note: *: significant at 90% level; **: significant at 95% level; ***: significant at 99% level. 
 
 
 
